Small states have attracted a large amount of research. In this paper we test whether small states are any different from other states in terms of their income, growth, and volatility outcomes. We find that, controlling for location, small states have higher per capita GDP than other states. This income advantage is largely due to a productivity advantage, constituting evidence against the idea that small states suffer from an inability to exploit increasing returns to scale. Small states also do not have different per capita growth rates than other states. Small states do have greater volatility of annual growth rates, which is in part due to their greater volatility of terms of trade shocks. This terms of trade-based volatility is in turn due to small states' greater openness. However, their greater openness on balance has a positive net payoff for growth. The one differential policy measure that might be relevant for small states is to further open up to international capital markets in order to better diversify risk, but the benefits of even that are still unresolved in the literature. We conclude that small states are no different from large states, and so should receive the same policy advice that large states do.
"Smallness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for slow economic development" T.N. Srinivasan (1986) "Economic storm clouds are gathering over paradise and the outlook is undeniably gloomy." A.J. Dolman (1985) Do small states suffer from their smallness? There are good theoretical reasons to believe that they do. The provision of public services may be subject to indivisibilities that lead to increasing returns to scale (Alesina and Spolaore (1997) ), especially fiscal institutions (Easterly and Rebelo (1993) ) and defense (Kuznets (1960) , Harden (1985) ). Many theories of economic growth suggest increasing returns to scale in the private economy as well (Romer (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , Aghion and Howitt (1998) ), which may be difficult to realize in small states. Small economies may also be at a disadvantage because their size prevents them from diversifying into a wide range of activities, making them more vulnerable to terms of trade shocks than large states (Commonwealth Secretariat (1998) , Briguglio (1995) , Armstrong and Read (1998) ). Many small states suffer from poor location in that they are remote and/or landlocked, and many are located in regions prone to hurricanes and volcanic activity (Srinivasan (1986) ).
Public officials in small states may be much more likely to be subjected to conflicting pressures (Farrugia (1993) ), and it may be difficult to recruit a high-quality civil service given the limited pool of candidates in small states (Streeten (1993) ). The trend towards trade multilateralism may put small states at a disadvantage because they presently benefit from many bilateral trade concessions (Armstrong and Read (1998) ).
These potential difficulties facing small states have not been lost on policymakers or academics. Numerous conferences and seminars on the special difficulties of small states have been convened over the past forty years (Robinson (1960) , Benedict (1967 ), Dobozi et. al. (1982 ), Commonwealth Consultative Group (1985 , 1997 ), Small States Financial Forum (1987 ,1988 , Kaminarides et. al. (1989) ). International organizations such as the United Nations have commissioned studies on the problems confronting small states for many years (United Nations (1971) , Doumenge (1983) , UNCTAD (1997) ) and the United Nations has formally recognized the special difficulties of small states in a resolution to that effect (Briguglio (1995) ). Titles of papers on small states (see our bibliography) frequently feature ominous terms and phrases such as "Problems", "Vulnerability", "Small is Dangerous", and even (twice) "Paradise Lost".
In this paper, we look for empirical evidence of alleged disadvantages of size by examining small states with population 1 million or less. If small size is a disadvantage, then these states must suffer with a vengeance. In particular, we would expect that small states must on average be less developed and grow less rapidly than larger states. We test this hypothesis using a large cross-country dataset including many small states. In light of the grim predictions of theory, the picture of small states which emerges from this analysis is somewhat surprising. After controlling for a range of factors, we find that small states have on average higher income and productivity levels than large states, and grow no more slowly than large states. Per capita GDP growth rates are more volatile in small states, due to their much greater exposure to international trade and fluctuations in their terms of trade. However, any growth disadvantages of this greater volatility are more than outweighed by the growth benefits of trade openness reaped by small states by virtue of their necessarily-large trade volumes. Finally, small states are well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities for international risk sharing, since the correlation of economic fluctuations in small states with the world business cycle is surprisingly low.
These results contribute evidence in support of the growing view in the literature that small size might not be a disadvantage after all. Kuznets (1960) notes that small states also have advantages: primarily that many are lucky to have good natural resources and have a small and more cohesive populations which allows them to adapt better to change. Srinivasan (1986) and Streeten (1993) argue without systematic empirical evidence that small may also be beautiful.
Using a sample of 48 countries Millner and Westaway (1993) fail to find evidence that the effect of a number of growth determinants varies with country size. Armstrong et. al. (1998) uses crosssectional regressions covering a large number of small states and independent regions to argue that population size does not significantly affect growth, controlling for initial income and regional effects.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we document that small states are richer and have higher productivity levels than large states. In the following section we observe that small states suffer no obvious growth rate disadvantage, and attribute this to a number of offsetting advantages and disadvantages of small states. In Section 3 we document that although terms of trade volatility contributes significantly to the greater volatility of growth in small states, this is not the whole story --a significant small state effect on volatility remains after we control for terms of trade variability. In Section 4 we note that small states are relatively well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities to diversify away their special risks since they currently are not particularly financially open and the shocks they receive are relatively uncorrelated with those experienced by the rest of the world. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
Small states and per capita income levels
In this paper, we consider a large cross section of 157 countries for which at least 10 years of annual data on per capita GDP adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity is available. Of these, 33 are small states defined as having an average population over the period 1960-1995 of less than one million. These countries are listed in 
where Y/L is output per person, A is the level of labor-augmenting productivity, s is the investment to GDP ratio, x is the rate of labor-augmenting productivity growth, δ is depreciation, n is population growth, and α is the share of capital income in GDP. We assume a productivity growth of 2 percent and a depreciation rate of 7 percent. We take logs of both sides and regress the log of output per person on the same dummies as above (capturing continental and other productivity differences) and the log of the second multiplicative term in (1):
We call this second term MRW, and report the results of this specification in the first column of held idea that small states suffer from productivity disadvantages due to their inability to exploit increasing returns to scale. We also note that our specification differs from Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) in that we allow the average level of productivity to vary across regions, and these differences are statistically significant (remember that the regressions include a full set of regional dummies). Once we allow the productivity level to vary, the coefficient on MRW implies a capital share of .28 --which is in line with most estimates from national income accounting.
It is interesting to decompose the MRW into its numerator and denominator from Equation (1). We do this in the second and third columns of Table 3 , where we regress the log investment rate and the population growth rate on the same set of dummy variables as before.
We find that that small states have significantly higher investment rates but not significantly lower population growth rates. This suggests that some portion of the previously-unexplained income differential between small states and large states can be explained by the former's higher investment rates.
We conclude with two important caveats regarding these results on the productivity and investment advantages of small states. First, the regressions in Table 3 do not control for differences across countries in human capital, since it is difficult to adequately measure saving in the form of human capital. As a result, the productivity advantage of small states to some extent reflects their human capital differences from the rest of the world. This is consistent with the strand of the literature that argues that small states need to rely on imported technology and high quality human capital to compensate for their lack of natural resources (Bhaduri et al. (1982) suggest human capital-intensive exported services as a way to escape "smallness"; Briguglio (1995) suggests the importance of regional technical cooperation; Milner and Westaway (1993) find that small states have a weak disadvantage in agricultural technological catch-up but a weak advantage in non-agricultural technological catch-up; and Armstrong and Read (1998) suggest that advances in transport and communications technology have helped offset "smallness" and "remoteness").
Second, we should take with more than a grain of salt the result that investment accounts for some of the income advantage of small states. The significance of the MRW term in Table 3 may reflect reverse causality -richer states can afford to invest more and are usually thought to choose lower population growth than poor states. Or it may reflect an omitted third factor, like incentive policies that affect both investment and income. It is difficult to adequately control for these possibilities. Instead, we simply note that they are likely to result in an overstatement of the contribution of investment to the income advantage of small states.
Micro States and Macro Growth
Even if small states do not have a disadvantage in terms of their income levels, they might grow more slowly over time for various reasons. Several endogenous growth theories predict that growth rates will be positively correlated with size due to scale effects. As we discuss below, small states exhibit greater output volatility, which has been shown empirically to have adverse effects on growth (Ramey and Ramey (1995)). What do the data say? In Figure 3 we show that small states have the same range of growth experiences as other states, suggesting that there is no obvious scale effect for growth rates that is related to population size. There is also no growth difference for small states after controlling for continental location, oil, and OECD dummies, as shown in the first column of Table 4 where we regress growth on these dummies and the small states dummy.
Why do small states not suffer any apparent growth disadvantages due to their small size?
To answer this question, we consider a parsimonious cross-country growth regression which captures two of the factors prominent in the small states debate: openness to international trade (measured as the share of imports and exports in GDP), and volatility (measured as the standard deviation of annual growth rates within each country). We also include initial income to capture convergence effects, and secondary school enrollment rates. The results are shown in the second column of Table 4 . All of the variables are significant of the expected sign. The negative coefficient on initial income shows that there is conditional convergence, secondary enrollment rates and trade openness are positively correlated with growth, and growth rate volatility has a negative effect on growth.
This regression framework provides some useful clues as to why the small state dummy is not significant in the basic regression in the first column of Table 4 . In particular, we can see from this regression that small states will have several offsetting advantages and disadvantages.
We have already seen that they are richer than other countries (relative to regional averages) and hence will have slower growth than average by the conditional convergence effect. They have slightly higher secondary enrollment rates, which would give them higher growth. Most important, as we document below, small states tend to have much higher trade shares (which is good for growth), offset by much higher volatility of growth rates (which is bad for growth). 2 As a result, the insignificance of the small state dummy in the growth regression suggests that the negative effects of high initial income and high volatility are roughly offset by the positive effects of trade openness and better educational attainment.
In order to document the magnitude of these offsetting effects, we first need to know how different small states are from non-small states in terms of their growth determinants. We document the well-known fact that small states typically have much higher trade ratios than larger states in the first column of Table 5 , where we regress this variable on the same set of dummy variables as before, as well as the small states dummy. The consequences for openness of being a small state are truly remarkable. Small states have a ratio of trade to GDP that is 54 percentage points (1.2 standard deviations) higher than the average economy controlling for continent dummies! Second, real per capita GDP growth rates tend to be much more volatile in small states. The second column of Table 5 shows that the standard deviation of annual real per capita GDP growth is 1.4 percentage points higher in small states than in non-small states. 3 Finally for completeness we show that while secondary school enrollment rates are modestly higher in small states, this difference is only marginally statistically significant.
These results suggest that the absence of a clear growth advantage of small states is due to three main offsetting effects: (i) they are significantly richer, and hence grow more slowly due to the conditional convergence effect; (ii) they are significantly more open to international trade, which is good for growth, and (iii) they suffer from significantly greater growth rate volatility, which is bad for growth. Interestingly, the positive growth effect of openness in Table 5 (0.012x0.54=0.65 percent) is 2.5 times larger than the negative growth effect (-1.79x0.014=-0.25 percent) of small states' greater output volatility. This suggests that even if output volatility is one of the consequences of openness (as we discuss in more detail below), small states' greater openness is still on balance a positive factor for small states' growth. This finding is of particular interest, given the widely held view that small states suffer from their openness. 4 Of course, any source of growth volatility that is not related to openness might still be detrimental to small states' growth performance.
Finally, it is interesting to note that one often-heard benefit of small states does not appear to be empirically very important. It is often argued that one of the advantages of small states is that they tend to be ethnically very homogeneous, which may make it easier for such states to forge the political consensus required to adjust to a changing environment (for example, Kuznets (1960) ). Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find that measures of ethnic fractionalization are associated with a lower level of public goods provision and lower growth. However, the mean value of an ethnolinguistic indicator of diversity among those small states for which data is available is insignificantly different from that among nonsmall states, suggesting that the benefits of homogeneity may not be especially pronounced for small states. 
Openness and Volatility
In the previous section we saw that small states reap growth benefits from their openness to international trade, but suffer growth costs due to the greater volatility of their growth rates. In this section we consider in more detail the relationship between trade openness and volatility in small states. A significant portion of the growth rate volatility experienced by small states can be attributed to volatility in their terms of trade, but this is not the entire story. Even after controlling for terms of trade volatility, growth rates in small states are significantly more volatile than in non-small states.
We first document that the volatility of terms of trade shocks experienced by small states is much greater than for larger states. We define terms of trade shocks as the growth in the local currency price of exports times the share of exports in GDP less the growth in the local currency price of imports less the share of imports in GDP, which captures both the magnitude of price fluctuations (changes in export and import prices) and their importance for the domestic economy (weighted by the shares of exports and imports in GDP). We then regress the standard deviation of this measure of terms of trade shocks on the same set of regional dummies as before, dummy variables to capture oil exporters and commodity exporters who are more likely to suffer extreme fluctuations in their terms of trade, and the small state dummy. The results are shown in the first column of Table 6 . We find that there is a highly-significant small state effect, with the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks larger by 0.013 (or about one-third of one standard deviation of the dependent variable) in small states.
This terms of trade volatility might be due to two factors. First, we have already seen that the share of trade in GDP is especially large in small states, and this may contribute to the magnitude of our measure of terms of trade shocks (since it weights changes in import and export prices by the shares of imports and exports in GDP). Second, small states' exports are likely to be more specialized than those of large states, both in terms of products exported and in terms of export markets (Kuznets (1960) , Armstrong and Read (1998)). As a result, the average prices of their exports and imports might be more volatile than in countries with more diversified trade patterns. The distinction between these two factors is important because there is little that small states can do about their overall trade volumes -autarky is simply not an option for small states that produce a much narrower range of goods and services than they consume, and moreover we have already documented the substantial growth benefits accruing to small states due to their openness. If in contrast the greater volatility of growth is due to excessive reliance on a few export products and a few export markets, then policies designed to help diversify exports may help to dampen economic fluctuations. 6 We can get a rough idea of the relative importance of these two factors by redefining the terms of trade shock as the unweighted difference between the growth in export prices and the growth in import prices. When we use this alternative measure of terms of trade shocks as the dependent variable in the second column of Table 6 , we find that the small states dummy is negative and insignificant. That is, the volatility of changes in the price of exports relative to imports is if anything lower in small states relative to larger states. Although this is not conclusive evidence, it does cast doubt on the notion that small states are especially vulnerable to external shocks simply because their international trade is more specialized. Rather, the greater volatility of terms of trade shocks in small states is primarily due to their unavoidably large trade shares.
Finally, it is worth noting that greater volatility of growth in small states is not solely due to their greater susceptibility to terms of trade shocks. To illustrate this point, we re-estimate the growth rate volatility regression in the second column of Table 4 , adding the volatility of the terms of trade as an explanatory variable. The results are shown in the last column of Table 6 .
We find that the small state dummy remains significant even after controlling for the effect of greater terms of trade volatility on the volatility of overall growth. This indicates that a significant portion of the volatility of output in small states is unrelated to their exposure to international trade. This additional volatility may be due to several factors. Many of the small states in our sample are located in areas prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, and the higher growth volatility in small states may simply reflect the devastating effect of these natural forces. However, it is also possible that some of this observed volatility reflects difficulties in measuring per capita incomes, which may be particularly acute in small states where statistical institutions may be weaker than average.
Opportunities for Diversification
In the previous section we have seen that small states experience much more volatile growth rates than non-small states. This in part reflects their greater vulnerability to terms of trade shocks, and perhaps also the tendency of many small states to suffer heavily from natural disasters. In this section we briefly consider the potential of small states to mitigate the adverse effects of this largely-unavoidable volatility by sharing risks with the rest of the world.
One of the potential benefits of financial openness is that it allows countries to share risks with the rest of the world, by holding claims on assets located outside their borders whose returns are not perfectly correlated with returns to domestic assets. The magnitude of these benefits depends on how volatile are shocks to the domestic economy, and the extent to which they are uncorrelated with shocks abroad. Small states are particularly well-situated to benefit from such risk sharing arrangements, for two reasons. First, small states suffer large shocks, as documented in Section 3. Second, in contrast to the often-heard view that small states are particularly susceptible to cyclical fluctuations abroad, we find that the shocks experienced by small states are not unusually correlated with the world business cycle. We illustrate this point in the first column of The second outcome measure of financial openness (capital inflows plus capital outflows as a share of GDP) paints a somewhat more favorable picture, as the small state dummy is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the volume of capital flows is slightly larger for small states than for non-small states, although the magnitude of this effect is small -only about 2-3 percentage points of GDP. Overall, this evidence suggests that small states are not as financially open as they might be given the high volatility they face, and hence are not fully exploiting opportunities for international risk diversification.
We conclude this section with the observation that although greater financial openness may help small states insure against the large shocks they receive, financial openness is itself no panacea. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Rodrik (1998) both note that there is no evidence
that financially-open economies grow faster or enjoy higher investment rates. On the other hand, there is also no systematic evidence in favor of the popular view that by opening up financially, countries expose themselves to greater volatility due to the vagaries of international financial markets (Kraay (1998)). In summary, although financial openness may provide a valuable means for small states to diversify some of the large risks they face, existing evidence does not support the view that there will be a large growth payoff from such policies.
Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that small states have perhaps received excessive attention from the literature -notwithstanding our own addition to the literature!--as special cases calling for special policy measures. We find that small states have, if anything, significantly higher per capita income than others in their region. There is no significant difference in growth performance between large and small states. It is true that growth volatility and volatility of terms of trade shocks as percent of GDP is higher in small states, but this is largely due to their greater trade openness -and the net benefits of openness on growth are positive. The one missing piece in the current situation of small states is that they are not fully exploiting the potential to diversify their risks by opening up to international capital movements. But even the payoff to filling in this last missing piece is unclear from evidence in the literature.
This is not to say that small states are free of economic problems! Many small states are still poor, and promoting growth as a means to alleviate poverty is as important in small poor states as it is in other poor countries. The good news is that the lessons of growth experience from all countries seem to be applicable to small states, so they can benefit from the large amount of cross-country evidence on the determinants of long-run growth.
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
This appendix documents the definitions of all variables and the data sources from which they were constructed. Variables are listed in the order in which they appear in the tables in the table below. The sample consists of all countries for which at least ten years of data on real per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity is available, as documented below. Since a number of very small states do not report national accounts data and/or are not included in the United Nations/World Bank Income Comparison Project, real per capita GDP data is not available for these states. As discussed in the text, it is not clear a priori what sorts of biases this might introduce. Nevertheless, some caution is in order before extending the results to the universe of small states.
All of the cross-sectional regressions are based on averages over all available years of the relevant variables. As a result, the time period covered for each country varies with the length of the time series available for that country. Due to unavailability of additional explanatory variables, the sample of countries covered in the regressions varies, ranging from the maximum possible of 157 to a minimum of 114. 
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